I have research interests in a range of areas within philosophy, most notably metaphysics, epistemology, and especially the philosophy of language. But the central philosophical problem with which much of my research is concerned is that of the intentionality of language and the metaphysics of meaning.

Intentionality is a feature which representations (typically) possess, namely, that of being about something, or having content. The problem of intentionality is to explain how it is that representations have the contents that they have; and in the case of language, the problem is to explain this feature of linguistic expressions and utterances.

In my master’s level BPhil thesis, On the Relative Priority of Thought and Language, I explored, albeit inconclusively, the question of whether the intentionality of language is derived from that of thought, or vice versa.

In my doctoral thesis, Semantics, Metasemantics, and Ontology, I investigated the possibility that the intentionality of language is not to be understood solely by appeal to the entities (if any) represented, arguing that the metaphysically necessary and sufficient truth conditions of our claims are revealed not by semantics, but by metasemantics. More details of this research can be found by following the link in the menu above.

More recently, in my post-doctoral research, I have begun to explore the nature of speech acts, and their (metasemantic) role in determining the contents of our linguistic representations. I have also worked on the nature of knowledge and justification, two-dimensional semantics, and quantifier variance, amongst other topics.

A selection of my papers can be found by following the link in the menu above. Please contact me if you have comments on, or questions about, my research.

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